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ABSTRACT
Puppet is a popular computer system configuration management
tool. It provides abstractions that enable administrators to setup
their computer systems declaratively. Its use suffers from two poten-
tial pitfalls. First, if ordering constraints are not specified whenever
an abstraction depends on another, the non-deterministic applica-
tion of abstractions can lead to race conditions. Second, if a service
is not tied to its resources through notification constructs, the sys-
tem may operate in a stale state whenever a resource gets modified.
Such faults can degrade a computing infrastructure’s availability
and functionality.
We have developed an approach that identifies these issues
through the analysis of a Puppet program and its system call trace.
Specifically, we present a formal model for traces, which allows
us to capture the interactions of Puppet abstractions with the file
system. By analyzing these interactions we identify (1) abstractions
that are related to each other (e.g., operate on the same file), and
(2) abstractions that should act as notifiers so that changes are cor-
rectly propagated. We then check the relationships from the trace’s
analysis against the program’s dependency graph: a representation
containing all the ordering constraints and notifications declared
in the program. If a mismatch is detected, our system reports a
potential fault.
We have evaluated our method on a large set of Puppet modules,
and discovered 57 previously unknown issues in 30 of them. Bench-
marking further shows that our approach can analyze in minutes
real-world configurations with a magnitude measured in thousands
of lines and millions of system calls.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software reliability; Soft-
ware testing and debugging; File systems management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of cloud computing and the advent of microservices
have made the management of multiple deployment and testing
environments a challenging and time-consuming task [5, 29, 32, 39].
Infrastructure as Code (IaC) methods and tools automate the setup
and provision of these environments, promoting reliability, docu-
mentation, and reuse [39]. Specifically, IaC (1) boosts the reliability
of an infrastructure, because it minimizes the human intervention
which is both time-consuming and error-prone; (2) ensures the
predictability and consistency of the final product, because it eases
the repetition of the steps followed to produce a specific outcome;
and (3) allows the documentation and reuse of a system’s configura-
tion, because it associates the system’s configuration with modular
code [22, 29, 39, 41].
Puppet [27] is one of the most popular system configuration
tools used in the IaC context [33, 37]. Puppet abstracts the actual
system resources through a declarative approach. It collects all the
declared abstractions from a program, and applies them one-by-one
so that the system eventually reaches the desired state.
By default, any execution sequence of abstractions is valid, un-
less there are specific ordering constraints imposed by the inter-
dependencies among them. For example, an Apache service should
run only after the installation of the corresponding package. There-
fore, developers need to declare any ordering constraints between
abstractions in their programs to remove erroneous execution se-
quences, e.g., trying to start a service before the installation of its
package. Conceptually, Puppet captures all the ordering relation-
ships defined in a program through a directed acyclic graph and
applies each abstraction in topological ordering. In this context, all
the unrelated abstractions are processed non-deterministically. Fur-
thermore, Puppet allows programmers to apply certain abstractions
whenever specific events take place via a feature called notification.
Notifications propagate changes to related resources, ensuring that
their state is up-to-date. For instance, when a configuration file
changes the corresponding service has to be notified so that it will
run with the new settings.
Tracking all the required ordering constraints and notifications
is a complicated task though, mostly because developers are not
always aware of the actual interactions of Puppet abstractions with
the underlying operating system. Notably, such errors can have a
negative impact on the reliability of an organization’s infrastruc-
ture leading to inconsistencies [37] and outages [18]. For example,
the Github’s services became unavailable when a missing notifier
in their Puppet codebase caused a chain of failures such as dns
timeouts [18].
Approaches that automatically detect these issues in produc-
tion code [20, 37] have significant room for improvement, facing
limitations that prevent them from being practical. Rehearsal [37]
employs static code verification and cannot handle realistic Pup-
pet programs. In particular, it cannot reason about programs that
abstract arbitrary shell commands. Additionally, the model-based
testing approach adopted by Citac [20] imposes a significant over-
head and restrictions on the supported Puppet programs under test
(they must be able to run in Docker1 containers). It also requires
extra instrumentation on the execution engine of Puppet. Finally,
none of those tools addresses missing notification issues.
1https://www.docker.com/
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We have developed a practical and effective approach to identify
faults involving ordering violations and notifiers in Puppet pro-
grams. To do so, we examine the system call trace produced by a
single execution. The stepping stone of our approach is FStrace; a
language for modeling a sequence of system call traces. We em-
ploy FStrace and operate in the following steps. First, we model the
system call trace of a Puppet program in FStrace. Through FStrace,
we derive an analysis that captures the interactions of higher-level
programming constructs (Puppet abstractions) with the file system,
and estimates the set of the expected relationships among them.
Then, for a given Puppet program, we build the dependency graph
which reflects all the ordering relationships and notifications that
have been specified by the developer. Finally, we verify whether the
expected relationships (as specified from the analysis of traces) hold
with respect to the dependency graph. Unlike previous tools [20, 37],
our approach (1) can reason about which system resources are af-
fected by the execution of a program and how, and (2) requires only
a single Puppet run for discovering issues.
Contributions. Our work makes the following contributions:
• We introduce FStrace, a language for modeling system call traces.
The interpretation rules of FStrace allow us to infer the impact
that higher-level building blocks have on the file system. The
model proposed is generic and can be leveraged—apart from
Puppet programs—by other domains (Section 3).
• We design a framework for detecting faults regarding ordering
violations and notifiers in Puppet programs. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first approach to deal with issues involving
notifiers. (Section 4).
• We provide an open-source implementation of our approach
(Section 5).
• We demonstrate the effectiveness and performance of our tool on
a large set of Puppet modules. Specifically, our tool was able to
detect 57 previously unknown faults in 30 Puppet modules. We
provided fixes for 21 projects and 16 of them were accepted and
integrated. This implies that our tool is capable of discovering
issues that are useful to developers (Section 6).
2 OVERVIEW
Here is a brief overview of Puppet, a motivating example that
demonstrates the types of defects our approach detects, and how
our approach is structured.
Puppet. Puppet enables developers to describe the desired state
of a system declaratively.
1 package {"apache2": ensure => "installed"}
2 file {"/etc/apache2/apache2.conf": ensure => "file"}
3 service {"apache2": ensure => "running"}
The code above indicates that the apache2 package should be
installed in the host, the file apache2.conf should exist in the
/etc/apache2/ path, and that the Apache server should be run-
ning. There are different types for abstracting system resources,
including but not limited to, file, package, service, exec. Beyond
that, the Puppet language provides conditionals, loops, and—for
reusability—supports the creation of new abstractions and classes.
Puppet code is stored in files called manifests. Puppet compiles
manifests into catalogs that specify all the abstractions it needs to
apply in a particular system to reach the desired state [26]. Then, it
evaluates the compiled catalogs and applies potential changes, if
1 class ntp (..., String $defaults_file = "/etc/default/ntp") {
2 package { "ntp": ensure => $package_ensure }
3 file { "/etc/ntp.conf":
4 ensure => "present",
5 require => Package[$package],
6 }
7 if $defaults_file {
8 file { $defaults_file:
9 ensure => "present",
10 content => "conf content..."
11 require => Package["ntp"],
12 }
13 }
14 $service_subscribe = $defaults_file ? {
15 true => [ File[$defaults_file], File["/etc/ntp.conf"] ],
16 default => [ File["/etc/ntp.conf"] ],
17 }
18 service { "ntp":
19 ensure => "running",
20 require => File[/etc/ntp.conf],
21 subscribe => $service_subscribe,
22 }}
Figure 1: A Puppet program that manifests a missing order-
ing relationship and notifier. We omit irrelevant code.
the system is not in the appropriate state. For example, if a file does
not exist at a certain location, Puppet will create it. The execution of
a catalog must be idempotent [25], so that the evaluation proceeds
only if the current and the desired state of the system do not match.
Motivating Example. In the following, we present amotivating
example that demonstrates the issues that our approach addresses.
Missing Ordering Relationships (MOR) occur when a developer
fails to define a happens-before relation between two Puppet ab-
stractions that depend on each other. This can lead to unstable code
that behaves correctly in some circumstances, but breaks in others
depending on the order that Puppet processes resources.
Consider the code snippet shown in Figure 1. This fragment
is taken from a real-world Puppet module [12], which defines
a class that setups a Network Time Protocol (ntp) service. This
class expects the String parameter $defaults_file as an argu-
ment (line 1), which stands for the path where the service’s de-
fault configuration file is created. Notice that the default value of
$defaults_file is /etc/default/ntp. Initially, at line 2, the pro-
gram installs the ntp package. Then, it creates a configuration file
at the path /etc/ntp.conf (lines 3–6). If the variable $defaults_-
file is defined, Puppet generates a file at the location specified by
$defaults_file (lines 7–13). Note that if Puppet finds an already
defined variable in the condition of an if statement, it implicitly co-
erces it to true. Puppet evaluates both file abstractions after the
package resource. This is expressed through the require property
at lines 5, 11.
In lines 18 to 22, the program declares that an ntp service
should be in a running state. Notice the subscribe parame-
ter at line 21, where the ntp service subscribes to the variable
$service_subscribe which in turn is computed at lines 14–17.
The subscribe construct states that the service depends on the
Puppet abstractions included in the service_subscribe variable.
The initial intention of the programmer is that when the
$defaults_file is defined, then the service should subscribe to
both File[$default_file] and File["/etc/ntp.conf"] (line
2
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Figure 2: The Abstract Architecture of our Framework.
15). However, unlike if statements, the operand of the “?” oper-
ator (i.e, $defaults_file) at line 14 never evaluates to true be-
cause it is a String variable. Therefore, the program considers only
the default case (line 16) where the subscribers’ list only contains
File[/etc/ntp.conf]. As a result, the dependency between the
service and the /etc/default/ntp file is never created. In other
words, Puppet might apply service before the configuration of
/etc/default/ntp. A fix to this problem is to replace “?” operator
with an if statement.
Missing Notifiers (MN). Notifiers are necessary for many entities
such as configuration files and services. An update to a configu-
ration file should trigger the restart of the corresponding service,
because these files typically describe settings processed during a
service’s startup. For example the configuration file of an Apache
service lists additional modules that should be loaded into memory.
A missing notifier issue is illustrated in Figure 1. The subscribe
primitive (line 21) creates a notifier that restarts the ntp ser-
vice whenever there is a change to the resources included in the
$service_subscribe list. Although the programmer’s intention
was correct, the programming error at lines 14–17 causes an unex-
pected behavior: the service does not restart even if the configu-
ration /etc/default/ntp changes because the service subscribes
only to /etc/ntp.conf.
Framework. To address these issues, we propose a framework—
illustrated in Figure 2—that operates as follows. First, it monitors
the system calls of the Puppet process and its descendants. Then,
the framework employs two components: the trace analyzer, and
the fault detector. The trace analyzer takes as input a system cal
trace derived from the application of a Puppet configuration, and
it interprets each system call based on the model described in Sec-
tion 3. The analyzer is instantiated with the block tagger component,
which splits system calls into different blocks that correspond to
Puppet abstractions. The analysis output is the set of the effects
that Puppet abstractions have on the file system. The fault detector,
generates the directed acyclic graph containing all the ordering
constraints and notifications declared in a Puppet program, and
compares it against the expected relationships inferred from the
output of the trace analysis. If a mismatch is identified, the fault
detector reports a potential fault.
Trace Example. To generates traces, we exploit a system call
tracing program [28, 35], namely, strace. Figure 3 presents an ex-
cerpt from the trace of the program of Figure 1. Each line denotes
an invocation of a system call along with the process (pid) that trig-
gered it. For example, the entry 103 close(7) = 0 states that the
process with id = 103, invoked close with 7 as an argument, and
that system call returned 0. By further inspecting Figure 3, we ob-
serve that Puppet initially processes the File[/etc/default/ntp]
resource (lines 2–7), and then the ntp service (lines 8–16). Observe
the calls of write at lines 2, 7–8, 16. These calls correspond to mes-
sages printed to the standard output by Puppet indicating the points
where the application of each abstraction starts and ends respec-
tively. We exploit these points to classify system calls according to
the Puppet abstraction they come from (Section 3.2).
3 MODELING SYSTEM CALL TRACES
We formally introduce FStrace, the language we use to model system
calls in it, and discuss how we model traces stemming from Puppet
programs.
3.1 The FStrace Language
FStrace primitives are designed to model system calls that operate
on file system resources. Some of the constructs have direct corre-
spondence with the actual system calls, while others are generic
enough so that they can represent a family of system calls. We
group system calls into execution blocks, with a unique id. FStrace
assumes that within a block, all system calls are processed sequen-
tially. However, the execution order at the level of blocks is not
deterministic. Therefore, there is no guaarantee that a block b1 is
always processed before b2, even if the former appears before the
latter in traces. FStrace processes every execution block atomically,
and nested blocks are not allowed.
3.1.1 Syntax and Domains. Figure 4 shows the syntax of FStrace.
The language constists of file names, paths—which are sequences
of file names—and file descriptors represented by either an integer
or the at_fdcwd construct. We also include (1) flags (e.g., read-mode,
write-mode, o_trunc) that indicate how a file is opened, (2) the con-
structs fd and cwd that provide information for cloning a process,
(3) primitives (consumed, produced, expunged), that stand for the
types of the effect that a system call has on a file, and (4) an infinite
set of unique identifiers for execution blocks. A trace is a sequence
of blocks. A block has the following syntax: begin b (z, s)∗ end,
where b implies its id and (z, s)∗ is a sequence of trace entries. Each
pair (z, s) is a process id (pid), which is a positive integer, and a
system call. Finally, FStrace models every system call s ∈ Sys using
the following eleven constructs.
chdir p changes the working directory of the current process to p.
clone c∗ f spawns a new process whose pid is f . The given flags
c∗ reveal what kind of information is shared between the parent
and the child process.
close f disassociates the file descriptor f from the corresponding
resource.
dupfd f1 f2 creates a new file descriptor f2 as a copy of f1. This
construct models a number of system calls such as dup, dup2, dup3,
fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD).
hpath d p m captures the effect m that a system call has on the
path p. If the given path name is not absolute, we interpret it as
relative to the file descriptor d . If the value of d is at_fdcwd, we
consider p relative to the current working directory. Otherwise, if
p is absolute, we ignore d . In this way, we can represent the system
calls whose suffix is “at” (e.g., linkat, renameat) or system calls
that take relative paths as arguments. For instance, the system
call stat("foo",. . .)—which retrieves the main information
and attributes of the file foo—is represented as hpath at_fdcwd
foo consumed. On the other hand, we represent the system call
mkdir("/foo/bar")—which creates a new directory at path
/foo/bar—as hpath at_fdcwd (“/”, “foo”, “bar”) produced.
3
1 ...
2 103 write(1, "Info: /Stage[main]/Ntp/File[/etc/default/ntp]: Starting to evaluate the resource", 91) = 91
3 103 open("/etc/default/ntp20190128-32-15kba2r", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600) = 7
4 103 write(7, "conf content"..., 44) = 44
5 103 close(7) = 0
6 103 rename("/etc/default/ntp20190128-32-15kba2r", "/etc/default/ntp") = 0
7 103 write(1, "Info: /Stage[main]/Ntp/File[/etc/default/ntp]: Evaluated in 0.06 seconds", 83) = 83
8 103 write(1, "Info: /Stage[main]/Ntp/Service[ntp]: Starting to evaluate the resource", 81) = 81
9 ...
10 103 execve("/etc/init.d/ntp", ["/etc/init.d/ntp", "start"], ...) = 0
11 ...
12 650 clone(child_stack=NULL, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD, child_tidptr=0x7f70159c39d0) = 660
13 ...
14 660 open("/etc/default/ntp", O_RDONLY) = 3
15 660 read(3, "conf content..."..., 44) = 44
16 103 write(1, "Info: /Stage[main]/Ntp/Service[ntp]: Evaluated in 1.85 seconds", 73) = 73
Figure 3: An example of trace produced by the strace.
f ∈ F = Z, z ∈ Proc = Z∗, b ∈ BlockID, v ∈ Filename
e ∈ Trace ::= x∗
x ∈ Block ::= begin b (z, s)∗ end
s ∈ Sys ::= chdir p | clone c∗ f | close f | dupfd f1 f2 |
hpath d p m | hpathsym d p m | link d1 p1 d2 p2 |
open d p o∗ f | rename d1 p1 d2 p2 | symlink d p1 p2 | nop
m ∈ E f f ::= consumed | produced | expunged
c ∈ CloneFlaдs ::= fd | cwd
m ∈ OpenFlaдs ::= read | write | trunc | creat
d ∈ DirFd ::= f | at_fdcwd
p ∈ Path ::= v∗
Figure 4: The syntax of FStrace.
hpathsym d p m operates in a way similar to hpath. In hpathsym
though, if the given path p is a symbolic link, we do not dereference
it. Through hpathsym we express system calls that do not follow
symbolic links such as lstat, lchown, lgetxattr.
link d1 p1 d2 p2 creates a hard link that points to the same resource
as the file indicated by the file descriptor d1 and the path p1.
open d p o∗ f associates the file indicated by the path p with the
file descriptor f . A sequence of flags o∗ captures the operations
that can be performed on the file.
rename d1 p1 d2 p2 arranges that a given file, specified through
the path defined by the file descriptor d1 and path p1, is accessed
through the new path defined by d2 and p2.
symlink p1 d p2 creates a symbolic link file at the location specified
by the file descriptor d and path p2 pointing to the path p1.
nop (no operation) does not affect the state. We use nop to model
all system calls that we do not need to take into account, e.g.,
getpid, sync.
Figure 5 illustrates the semantic domains of FStrace. FStrace
introduces six major components: An inode table τ ∈ INodeT is
a map of a pair, consisting of an inode and a file name to another
inode. An inode is a positive integer that acts as the identifier for
a certain file system resource. Note that we also keep the special
inode ιr which corresponds to the inode of the root directory “/”.
The inode table mimics the inode structure implemented in Unix-
like operating systems. In this context, the first element of the key is
the inode of the directory where the file name exists. For example,
the inode of the /foo file, whose value is 3, is stored as follows:
ι ∈ I Node = {ιi | i ∈ Z∗ } ∪ {ιr }
α ∈ Addr = {αi | i ∈ Z∗ }
τ ∈ I NodeT = (I Node × F ilename) → I Node
π ∈ FdT = Addr ↪→ (F ↪→ I Node)
ν ∈ ProcT = Proc → (Addr × Addr )
ϕ ∈ CwdT = Addr ↪→ I Node
κ ∈ SymT = I Node ↪→ Path
ρ ∈ Res = Path ↪→ P(Ef f × Block )
Figure 5: Semantic domains for FStrace.
[(ιr , “foo”) → 3)]. A file descriptor table π ∈ FdT maps an address
and a file descriptor to an inode. We use this component to map
open file descriptors of a process to the resource they handle. The
CwdT element maps an address to an inode. That inode stands for
the current working directory of a process.
Observe that we do not use the pid found in the trace entries as
the key of the two definitions above. Instead, we have an indirection:
each process points to a pair of addresses (e.g., see the domain
ProcT ). The first element of the pair is the address that stores the
file descriptor table of the process. The second element of the pair
reflects the address where the current working directory of the
process is located. Therefore, two different processes might share
the same file descriptor table or working directory. For example,
in the following entries: [(z1 → (α1,α2)), z2 → (α1,α3)], the
processes z1 and z2 point to the same file descriptor table because
the first elements of their pairs are identical (i.e., α1). Similarly, since
their second addresses do not match (i.e, α2 , α3), we presume
that they do not share the same working directory; thus, a change
imposed by any process does not affect the other one.
A table of symbolic links κ ∈ SymT is a partial map of inodes
to paths. This domain holds the path names that symbolic links—
identified by their inodes—point to. The last component of FS-
trace (ρ ∈ Res) maps path names to an element of the power set
of blocks and effects. Specifically, this component tracks where
and how each path is accessed. For example, the entry /foo →
{(produced,b1), (consumed,b2)} indicates that the path /foo is pro-
duced in the block b1 and consumed in b2. The state ⟨τ ,π ,ϕ,ν ,κ, ρ⟩
is a tuple consisting of the six components described above.
3.1.2 Preliminary Definitions. A number of specific operations
apply to FStrace’s domains. The binary operator :: denotes the
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addition of an element to a set, while ↓i manifests the projection of
the ith element. Also, we define the following auxilliary functions:
• I (p,τ ): returns the inode to which the path p points based on
the inode table τ .
• P(ι,τ ): returns the paths that point to the inode ι according to
the inode table τ .
• join(p1,p2): joins the two paths p1 and p2.
• dir (p) returns the parent directory of the path p.
• base(p) returns the base name of the path p.
We also define the function Ab(d,p, l , r ,τ ) which gives the absolute
path for a given path name p and a file descriptor d with regards
to the provided open file descriptors l and the current working
directory r of a process.
Ab(d,p, l , r ,τ ) =

p, if p ↓1= “/”
join(P(r ,τ ) ↓1, p) if d = at_fdcwd
join(P(l(d),τ ) ↓1, p), otherwise
Finally, the function Op(m) gives the effect that the open system
call has on a file based on the flagsm. Op is defined as:
Op(m) =
{
produced, if (trunc ∈m ∧ write ∈m) ∨ creat ∈m
consumed, otherwise
3.1.3 Semantics. Figure 6 shows the semantics of FStrace. We
present a subset of our rules for brevity. Each rule follows the
form below:
⟨τ ,π ,ϕ,ν ,κ, ρ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ ′,π ′,ϕ ′,ν ′,κ ′, ρ ′⟩
The relation b,e−−→ indicates that given a trace entry e (a pair of
a pid and a system call) in execution block b, the initial state
⟨τ ,π ,ϕ,ν ,κ, ρ⟩ transitions to a new state ⟨τ ′,π ′,ϕ ′,ν ′,κ ′, ρ ′⟩.
[CHDIR] changes the working directory of the current process z.
First, it inspects the process table ν to get the address that holds the
value of the current process’s working directory. Then, it updates
ϕ so that the address α points to the inode of the path p.
[CLONE-COPY] demonstrates the case where we spawn a new
process f by passing the empty sequence c = ∅. In this case, f
shares neither the file descriptor table nor the working directory
with the parent process z. So, we make copies of those values by
creating two fresh addresses α1,α2. Then, we update the process
table ν so that the new process f points to those new addresses.
[CLONE-SHARE] behaves in a similar way with [CLONE-COPY].
However, this time, the new process f shares the open file descrip-
tors (flag fd) and the working directory with z (flag cwd). Therefore,
the freshly-created process f points to the same addresses as z.
[DUPFD] involves the scenario where we duplicate a provided
file descriptor. Specifically, we lookup the address α of the current
process’s file descriptors table. Then, we retrieve the inode ι pointed
by the file descriptor f1. Finally, we add the file descriptor f2, whose
inode value is ι, to the file descriptor table of z.
[OPEN] opens a file and returns a new file descriptor. First, it
inspects the addresses α1,α2 where the file descriptor table and
the working directory of the process z are located. Through the Ab
function, it computes the absolute path p′ using the file descriptor
d , and the path p. This computation is boilerplate, so we abbreviate
it as Ab(d,p, . . . ) in the next rules. Given the flags o∗, it estimates
the effectm that open has on the path p′ (via the function Op). In
turn, it performs two updates. First, it adds f to the file descriptor
table of the process z using the address α1. Notice that f points
to the inode of the path p′ (f → I (p′)). Second, it updates the ρ
element: the path p′ receives the effectm in the the block b.
[HPATH] records the effectm that a system call has in the current
execution block b. It handles the case when the given effect m
is not expunged. Specifically, it determines the absolute path p′
through Ab(d,p, . . . ). It then inspects the symbolic link table to
check whether the path p′ points to another path or not. If this is
the case (i.e., κ(p′) , undef), we associate the resulting resource
p′′ with the effectm in the current execution block b. Note that the
hpathsym operates similarly, but it does not check whether p′ is a
symbolic link or not; it just considers the path p′.
[HPATH-EXPNG] illustrates the case where we expunge the pro-
vided file. As before, we first compute the absolute path p′ asso-
ciated with that resource. Subsequently, we remove all the effects
associated with p′ in the current execution block b, leading to the
set l ′ (i.e., l = {m | ∀m ∈ ρ(p′) : m ↓2, b}). We add the expunged
effect to l ′, and finally, we unlink the path p′ from the inode table.
For unlinking, the pair (I (p1),p2) refers to undef. Notice that p1 is
the parent directory of p′, and p2 is the base name of p′.
[LINK] creates a hard link between two files. As a starting point,
we take the absolute paths p′1 and p
′
2, where p
′
1 corresponds to the
existing file, while p′2 stands for the path where we create the hard
link. Then, the inode of the new path p′2 is identical to that of p
′
1
(τ ′ = τ [(I (w), t) → I (p′1)]). We also change the table ρ so that the
path p′2 is produced in the current execution block b.
[SYMLINK] creates a new symbolic link that points to the path
p1. It first estimates the absolute path p′2 of the fresh symbolic link.
Then, it creates a new inode ι which the symbolic link points to by
updating the inode table τ . It also changes the table κ so that the
new inode ι targets the path p1. Finally, the path p′2 is produced in
the current execution block b leading to the new table ρ ′.
[RENAME] renames the name of a given file. First, it retrieves the
absolute paths corresponding to the old and the new path names
(i.e, p′1 and p
′
2). Then, it updates the inode table τ : the inode of p
′
2
is the same with that of p′1. In turn, it removes p
′
1 from the inode
table (i.e., p′1 points to undef). For these updates, it is necessary
to estimate: (1) the inode of their parent directories, and (2) their
base names. Finally, it updates the component ρ. In particular, it
removes any effects on path p′1 that took place within the block b,
and it marks p′1 as expunged and p
′
2 as produced in b.
3.2 Modeling Puppet Traces
To leverage FStrace we need to group system calls into blocks
corresponding to higher-level programming constructs. Specifically
for Puppet artifacts, it makes sense to classify system calls according
to the Puppet abstraction where they come from. In this context, we
presume that an execution block begins or endswhen the evaluation
of a Puppet abstraction starts or terminates. Thus, the name of the
execution block corresponds to the name of the Puppet abstraction.
It is easy to identify the points where the evaluation of a Puppet
abstraction starts/finishes by decoding the Puppet’s debug mes-
sages. Recall from Figure 3 that those messages appear in the exe-
cution traces as writes to the standard output. We have developed
a block tagger for Puppet that detects those debug messages and
marks them as the entry and exit points of execution blocks. For
example, consider again the traces in Figure 3. We can model the
5
chdir
e = z, chdir p
α = ν (z) ↓2 ϕ′ = ϕ[α → I (p, τ )]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π , ϕ′, ν, κ, ρ ⟩
clone-copy
e = z, clone ∅ f
fresh α1 fresh α2 ν ′ = ν [f → (α1, α2)]
π ′ = π ′[α1 → π (z)] ϕ′ = ϕ[α2 → ϕ(z)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π ′, ϕ′, ν ′, κ, ρ ⟩
clone-share
e = z, clone (fd, cwd) f
(α1, α2) = ν (z) ν ′ = ν [f → (α1, α2)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν ′, κ, ρ ⟩
dupfd
e = z, dupfd f1 f2
α = ν (z) ↓1 ι = π (α )(f1)
π ′ = π [(α → (π (α )[f2 → ι])]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π ′, ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩
open
e = z, open d p o f
(α1, α2) = ν (z) p′ = Ab(d, p, π (α1), ϕ(α2), τ )
m = Op(o) π ′ = π [α1 → π (α1)[f → I (p′)]]
ρ′ = ρ[p′ → (m, b) :: ρ(p′)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π ′, ϕ, ν, κ, ρ′⟩
hpath
e = z, hpath d p m
m , expunged p′ = Ab(d, p, . . . )
p′′ = κ(I (p′)) p′′ , undef
ρ′ = ρ[p′′ → (m, b) :: ρ(p′′)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ′⟩
hpath-expng
e = z, hpath d p expunged
p′ = Ab(d, p, . . . )
l = {m | ∀m ∈ ρ(p′) : m ↓2, b }
ρ′ = ρ′[p′ → (expunged, b) :: l ]
p1 = dir (p) p2 = base(p)
τ ′ = τ [(I (p1), p2) → undef]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ ′, π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ′⟩
link
e = z, link d1 p1 d2 p2
p′1 = Ab(d1, p1, . . . ) p′2 = Ab(d2, p2, . . . )
w = dir (p′2) t = base(p′2)
τ ′ = τ [(I (w ), t ) → I (p′1)]
ρ′ = ρ[p′2 → (produced, b) :: ρ(p′2)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ ′, π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ′⟩
symlink
e = z, symlink p1 d p2
p′2 = Ab(d2, p2, . . . ) fresh ι
w = dir (p′2) t = base(p′2)
τ ′ = τ [(I (w ), t ) → ι] κ′ = κ[ι → p1]
ρ′ = ρ[p′2 → (produced, b) :: ρ(p′2)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ ′, π , ϕ, ν, κ′, ρ′⟩
rename
e = z, rename d1 p1 d2 p2
p′1 = Ab(d1, p1, . . . ) p′2 = Ab(d2, p2, . . . ) w1 = dir (p′1)
t1 = base(p′1) w2 = dir (p′2) t2 = base(p′2) l = ρ(p′1) l ′ = {e | ∀e ∈ l : e ↓2, α }
τ ′ = τ [(I (w2), t2) → I (p′1)][(I (w1), t1) → undef] ρ′ = ρ[p′1 → (expunged, b) :: l ′][p′2 → (produced, b) :: ρ(p′2)]
⟨τ , π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ ⟩ b,e−−→ ⟨τ ′, π , ϕ, ν, κ, ρ′⟩
Figure 6: The interpretation rules of FStrace.
before
before
notify
service
package
conf1
conf2
Figure 7: The dependency graph of the program of Figure 1.
trace entry at line 2 as the entry point of an execution block whose
name is “File[/etc/default/ntp]”, whereas the system call at
line 8 signals the ending of that execution block. Hence, all sys-
tem calls that appear between lines 2 and 8, are included in the
aforementioned block.
4 DETECTING FAULTS
We locate faults in Puppet programs by combining the trace analysis
output with the dependency graph: a directed acyclic graph used
to capture all the ordering and notification relationships between
the abstractions of a given Puppet program.
4.1 The Dependency Graph
We consider the dependency graph as an element of the following
power set:
д ∈ DG = P(P × P × L)
where P is the set of Puppet abstractions, and L = {notify, before}.
An entry (p1,p2, l) ∈ д means that the Puppet abstraction p2 is
dependent on p1. The label l shows the relationship’s type between
p1 and b2: if l = before, p1 is processed before p2, whereas if l =
notify, apart from preceding p2, p1 also sends notifications to p2.
Let the binary relation ≺д on nodes of a dependency graph
д ∈ CG defined as follows
p1 ≺д p2 ⇒ (p1,p2, l) ∈ д, where p1,p2 ∈ P , l ∈ L
This relation is transitive so
p1 ≺д p2 ∧ p2 ≺д p3 ⇒ p1 ≺д p3, where ,p1,p2,p3 ∈ P
The relation≺д forms a happens-before relation between two Puppet
abstractions i.e., if there is path (of any length) from p1 to p2, then
the former is executed before the latter.
Similarly, we define the transitive relation →д on nodes of a
dependency graph д ∈ CG as
p1 →д p2 ⇒ (p1,p2, notify) ∈ д
p1 →д p2 ∧ p2 →д p3 ⇒ p1 →д p3, where p1,p2,p3 ∈ P
The relation p1 →д p2 indicates that the abstraction p1 notifies p2.
For that purpose, it only considers paths in д with notify edges.
Figure 7 depicts the dependency graph of the program of Figure 1.
For brevity, the node conf1 stands for the /etc/ntp.conf, and
conf2 is the /etc/default/ntp file. We observe that the resource
/etc/default/ntp has neither an ordering nor a notification rela-
tionship with the service, because the corresponding nodes are
not connected to each other. Also, package does not send notifica-
tions to service because there is no path from the former to the
latter where all edges have notify labels.
4.2 Combining FStrace with the Dependency
Graph
The dependency graph is a key element in our fault detection ap-
proach. Recall that the execution blocks in FStrace are not totally
ordered. For example, consider two blocks b1, b2 that affect the
same file: b1 produces it and b2 reads its contents. In this case, b2
can be processed first, because FStrace does not define a temporal
relation between the two blocks. As a result, there will be a failure
because b2 will attempt to consume a file that does not exist.
Thankfully, the dependency graph of a Puppet program can be
employed to define the ordering relationships of two execution
blocks (expressed through the ≺д relation). Specifically, we need
to check whether the ≺д relation is defined for b1, b2 to identify
missing ordering relationships.
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Algorithm 1 Detecting Faults
Input: ρ ∈ Res, д ∈ CG
1: for all p , l in ρ do
2: get consumed c = {b | ∀(m, b) ∈ l .m = consumed}
3: get produced t = {b | ∀(m, b) ∈ l .m = produced}
4: for all (b1, b2) ∈ t × c do
5: if b1 ⊀д b2 ∧ b2 ⊀д b1 ∧ b1 , b2 then
6: report MOR between b1, b2 on path p
7: end if
8: if isService(b2) then
9: if b1 ↛д b2 then
10: report MN from b1 to b2
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
For missing notifiers, we first need to identify pairs of Puppet ab-
stractions where the application of the first element should trigger
the application of the second one. To this end, we look for blocks
that produce a particular resource p. If the same resource p is con-
sumed by a block that maps to a service, presumably, the blocks,
which produced p, should have notification relationships with the
service block. That is, if they produce an update to p, service
should be refreshed to consume the new version of p.
Algorithm 1 summarizes our fault detection approach. The al-
gorithm expects as input the map ρ ∈ Res—as specified from the
analysis of traces—and a dependency graph д ∈ CG . Then it iterates
over every key-value pair of ρ. Recall that ρ is a map of a path p
to a set of pairs l ; each pair (m,b) ∈ l stands for the effectm that
took place in the block b. For a certain path p, we retrieve the set of
blocks c that consumed p (line 2). Then, at line 3, we do the same
in order to compute the set of blocks t that produced p. In turn, for
every block pair (b1,b2) of the Cartesian product t × c , we check
whether there is a happens-before relation between b1 and b2. If
b2 is not dependent on b1 (b1 ⊀д b2) and vice versa, we report a
missing ordering relationship (line 6).
As a next step, the algorithm checks for missing notifiers. If the
block b2, which consumed p, corresponds to a service (line 8), the
algorithm examines whether the relation b1 →д b2 holds (line 9).
If the block b1, which produced p, does not send notifications to
the service b2 the algorithm reports a missing notifier (line 10).
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Here are our method’s implementation details and their current
limitations.
5.1 Details
We have developed a prototype that implements our approach in
the OCaml programming language2. Our tool consists of three
different components: (1) an executor that is responsible for tracing
Puppet programs by taking a Puppet manifest as input and executes
it using strace to collect traces; (2) an analyzer that receives a
sequence of system calls, models them in FStrace, and implements
the interpretation rules presented in Figure 6; (3) a fault detector for
Puppet, which takes the analyzer’s output and follows the steps of
2We plan to release it as an open-source software.
Algorithm 1. Note that, we build the dependency graph of a Puppet
program through a simple analysis of the catalogs produced by
Puppet after the compilation of the manifests. (Catalogs are json
documents that list all Puppet abstractions that are going to be
applied along with their dependencies.)
We have implemented our method with efficiency in mind. Our
tool is able to handle gb-sized traces with reasonable time and space
requirements (see Section 6.4). This was made possible through a
number of optimizations, such as the use of streams to process and
analyze traces, a reversed inode table to lookup paths based on
their inodes, and function memoization.
5.2 Current Limitations
Currently, our tool can only support Linux distributions because
strace is a utility for Linux-based operating systems. However, we
can easily extend it to support other posix-compliant environments
such as FreeBSD or Solaris. Also, as we will observe in Section 6, our
tool might produce false positives when two Puppet abstractions
operate on the same file, but they are commutative to each other, i.e.,
the application order does not matter. Even though commutative
pairs of abstractions are not so common (see Section 6), we plan to
address this issue in future work by examining Puppet catalogs to
identify such pairs.
6 EVALUATION
We have evaluated our framework by examining a large number
of Puppet modules in order to answer the following research ques-
tions.
RQ1 Is the proposed approach effective for finding faults in Puppet
manifests? (Section 6.2)
RQ2 How can we categorize the detected faults? (Section 6.3)
RQ3 What is the performance of our analysis? (Section 6.4)
6.1 Experimental Setup
We collected a large number of Puppet modules taken from Forge
api3 and Github. We were particularly interested in modules that
support Debian Stretch, because Debian is one of the most popular
Linux distributions [1]. We used Docker to spawn a clean Debian
environment efficiently. Then, we ran our framework on every
module separately. We monitored the Puppet process and collected
the system call trace of every program through strace. Finally,
we ran each step (trace analysis and fault detection) and logged
the reports generated by our framework. Through this process, we
successfully ran and analyzed 351 Puppet modules in total.
To compute the performance of our approach we ran the trace
analysis and fault detection steps ten times to get reliable measure-
ments. By examining the standard deviation, we observed that the
running times did not vary significantly among different executions.
All the experiments were run on a Virtual Machine with an 2.1ghz
8-core processor and 8gb of ram.
6.2 Fault Detection Results
Our framework detected 57 previously unknown issues in 30 Puppet
modules. Table 1 presents the analysis results for each module.
Notably, this is the first study that led to the disclosure of such
a large number of faults in Puppet repositories. Our framework
marks 43 out of 57 faults as missing ordering relationships (column
3https://forgeapi.puppetlabs.com/
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Table 1: Faults found in Puppet modules
Fix
# Module # Faults MOR MN Accepted
1 istlab-stereo 9 9 0 "
2 geoffwilliams-auditd 4 4 0 -
3 wiltonms-webserver 4 4 0 -
4 nogueirawash-mysqlserver 3 3 0 -
5 puppet-proxysql 3 3 0 "
6 saz-ntp 3 1 2 -
7 deric-mesos 3 0 3 "
8 hardening-os_hardening 2 2 0 "
9 saz-locales 2 2 0 -
10 vpgrp-influxdbrelay 2 2 0 "
11 jgazeley-freeradius 2 1 1 "
12 ploperations-puppet 2 1 1 -
13 walkamongus-codedeploy 1 1 0 "
14 spynappels-support_sysstat 1 1 0 -
15 cirrax-dovecot 1 1 0 "
16 sgnl05-sssd 1 1 0 -
17 roshan-mysqlzrm 1 1 0 -
18 puppetfinland-nano 1 1 0 "
19 olivierHa-influxdb 1 1 0 -
20 noerdisch-codeception 1 1 0 -
21 nextrevision-flowtools 1 1 0 "
22 baldurmen-plymouth 1 1 0 "
23 alertlogic-al_agents 1 1 0 -
24 puppet-telegraf 1 0 1 "
25 puppetlabs-apache 1 0 1 "
26 example42-apache 1 0 1 "
27 deric-zookeeper 1 0 1 "
28 camptocamp-tomcat 1 0 1 -
29 alexharvey-disable_transparent_hugepage 1 0 1 -
30 camptocamp-ssh 1 0 1 -"
Total 57 43 14 -
mor). We observe that ordering violations are the most prevalent
issue in the inspected Puppet manifests. The rest of the faults are
related to missing notifiers (column mn).
Based on the reports of our tool, we manually verified that each
reported fault can lead to a problematic situation by reproducing
each case. We provided fixes for 21 projects, and 16 of them were
accepted by their development teams and integrated into their code.
This indicates that our tool produces reports that are meaningful
to developers. At the time of the submission, none of our patches
have been rejected.
6.3 Fault Patterns
Below, we categorize and discuss some of the faults identified by
our framework. Most represent previously unknown to us fault
patterns which we learned through our tool.
6.3.1 Missing Ordering Relationships. We have observed two types
of missing ordering relationships issues.
Generate-Use Violation. The use of a resource must always
succeed its creation. Many modules fail to preserve that ordering re-
lationship. We observed this violation in 16 Puppet modules such as
alertlogic-al_agents, hardening-os_hardening, etc. Figure 8
shows a fragment from alertlogic-al_agents [7]. The code first
fetches a .deb package (a Debian archive) using the wget com-
mand (lines 1–5). The package is stored at the path specified by the
$package_path variable whose value is /tmp/al-agent. Then, the
code installs the Debian archive on the system (lines 6–10) through
dpkg. 4 It is easy to see that the package depends on exec because
4dpkg is a package management system for Debian-based operating systems
1 $package_path = "/tmp/al-agent"
2 exec {"download":
3 command => "/usr/bin/wget -O ${package_path} ${pkg_url}",
4 creates => $package_path
5 }
6 package {"al-agent":
7 ensure => "installed",
8 provider => "dpkg",
9 source => $package_path,
10 }
Figure 8: A Missing Ordering Relationship between package
and exec.
it requires $package_path (the .deb file) to exist in the system
(line 9) so that it can install the package successfully.
The Generate-Use category produces observable errors (errors
that manifest during the catalog’s application), when Puppet ap-
plies abstractions in the erroneous order. For example, when it
processes package before exec the application of the catalog fails
with the following error: “dpkg: error: cannot access archive
"/tmp/al-agent": No such file or directory”
Configure-Use Violation. The configuration of a file must pre-
cede its use. For example, when a service starts, all the files con-
sumed by that service have to be properly configured. This category
differs from the previous one because when a Puppet abstraction
attempts to use the file, the latter exists in the system. However,
this is not in the expected state (e.g., the file does not have the
right contents, permissions, etc). This error pattern appears in four
modules: saz-ntp, vpgrp-influxdbrelay, olivierHa-influxdb,
and ploperations-puppet.
Figure 1 illustrates a program with an issue related to this cate-
gory. When the ntp service starts, the configuration files are guar-
anteed to be there because the abstraction package creates them
during installation. However„ it is possible that the ntp service
does not read the desired contents of the /etc/default/ntp file
specified by content => "conf content..." (line 11), because
there is a missing ordering relationship between file and service.
Note that this category—unlike the previous one—might lead to
unexpected behaviors silently, i.e., the application of the catalog
does not produce any error messages.
6.3.2 Missing Notifiers. We have identified four different cate-
gories of issues related to notifiers.
Configuration Files. A configuration file must always send
notifications to a service so that any change to that file triggers the
restart of the corresponding service. Although this is a standard
pattern, we observed that in four modules (shown in rows 6, 7,
11, 12, 30 of Table 1) this is not the case. As an example recall the
program discussed in Section 2.
Log Files.Typically, services log various events in dedicated files.
For instance, the log file of an Apache server records—among other
things—every incoming http request. Log files are very beneficial
for debugging and monitoring purposes. When a service starts,
it opens a corresponding log file, which remains open, while the
service is up, to write any events that take place.
We discovered issues related to logging in two popular Puppet
modules (puppetlabs-apache [11], and deric-zookeeper [13]).
These modules declare the log files for the apache and zookeeper
services in their manifests. However, the log files do not have a
notifier for their associated services. This may lead to a problematic
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1 # config.pp manifest
2 define tomcat::instance::config (..., $basedir, $javahome) {
3 file {"/etc/init.d/tomcat-${name}":
4 ensure => $present,
5 content => template("tomcat/tomcat.init.erb"),
6 require => Concat["${catalina_base}/bin/setenv.sh"],
7 }
8 }
9 # tomcat/tomcat.init.erb template
10 export JAVA_HOME=<%= @javahome %>
11 export CATALINA_BASE=<%= @basedir %>
12 export CATALINA_PID=<%= @basedir %>/temp/tomcat.pid
Figure 9: Manifest and its template taken from
camptocamp-tomcat. We omit irrelevant code for brevity.
situation. Consider the casewhere the log file of a service is removed
from the host. When we remove an open file, the underlying system
call (unlink) does not update the file descriptors associated with
the removed file, even though Puppet will create a new one. This
means that although the file disappears from the file system, the
service still handles a file descriptor that points to the inode of the
original file. The issue is that after removal, the inode becomes an
orphan (i.e., it is not linked with any file), which means that it is
no longer accessible through a file path. Therefore, in the case of
a missing notifier, the log history of the upcoming events is lost
because the service writes to an orphan inode. To fix that issue,
the log file should notify the service so that the service opens the
newly-created log file.
Init Scripts. Init scripts specify how a service starts, stops or
restarts. In practice, they are wrapper shell scripts which setup
the required environment and invoke the actual executables of the
services with the appropriate parameters.
Puppet manifests, that manage init scripts should notify the
corresponding service whenever there is a change to those
scripts. The camptocamp-tomcat [16] and alexharvey-disable_-
transparent_hugepage [9] modules fail to follow that pat-
tern. Consider the code listed in Figure 9, coming from the
camptocamp-tomcatmodule. The Figure shows fragments, coming
from two different files. First, the config.pp Puppet manifest, de-
fines a custom abstraction named tomcat::instance::config,
which takes the variables $basedir and $javahome as param-
eters (line 1). This abstraction configures the init script of the
tomcat service (lines 2–8) whose contents are determined by the
tomcat/tomcat.init.erb template (lines 9–12). By examining
this template we see that, before the init script starts tomcat, it
sets some environment variables based on the values of the Puppet
parameters $basedir and javahome (lines 10–12). When there is
an update to the init script (e.g., $javahome variable has a differ-
ent value), Tomcat should restart in order to operate on the new
environment, e.g., to use a different version of Java.
Packages.When Puppet applies a package abstraction, the ser-
vice that depends on that package should restart. In this way, we en-
sure that a service gets all the necessary updates, including, security
patches, new features, etc. Our tool identified this kind of issue in
example42-apache [14], saz-ntp [12], and puppet-telegraf [8].
Specifically, the package abstractions that were responsible for in-
stalling the Apache, ntp, and telegraf did not notify the running
instances whenever there was a new version of those packages.
Figure 10: The trace analysis and fault detection time as a
function of the trace size. Each spot shows the average time
spent on both the trace analysis and fault detection phases
for a given trace obtained by the execution of a module.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
Figure 10 shows the running times (in seconds) of the trace analysis
and fault detection phases relatively to the size of the provided
traces (in mb). We observe that the correlation between the trace
size and analysis time is almost linear. Notice that our framework
is able to handle a large volume of traces (more than 1.2gb) in a
reasonable amount of time (< 3 minutes). The average trace size
and analysis time of the inspected modules is 84mb and 9 seconds
respectively.
There are 4 cases out of 351 (ceritsc-dkms,
datadog-datadog_agent, nexcess-ksplice, puppet-rabbitmq)
where the execution times were relatively high compared to the
rest of the modules. Nevertheless, they all remain in acceptable
limits. By examining the characteristics of the traces obtained by
the execution of these modules, we observed that they contain
more unlink system calls than the rest of the modules. Notably,
such calls involve more expensive operations on the analysis state
(they are modeled as hpath d,p expunged, recall Figure 6).
Overall, the overhead of the analysis is relatively small. We argue
that our approach is practical and can be used as part of the testing
process for Puppet manifests.
6.5 False Positives
We have manually inspected the reported issues and identified a po-
tential source of false positives. Consider two abstractions that are
commutative to each other. For example, in the claranet-varnish
module [10], the developers use two different abstractions to par-
tially configure a certain file. On the one hand they use file to set
the permissions and ownership of the file, and on the other they
use exec to initialize its contents. In this case the execution order
in which Puppet processes abstractions does not matter. Specifi-
cally, Puppet can first use exec to create the file with the desired
contents, and then apply file to set the appropriate file’s attributes
or vice versa. Our approach reported false positives only in 7 out
of 351 cases. Therefore, we argue that this pattern (i.e, configuring
a file through the combination of abstractions) is not particularly
common.
We noticed one more false positive which was related to missing
notifiers. The developers of bodgit-dbus [15] use a custom com-
mand (expressed via exec) to reload the configuration of the service.
Consequently, the configuration files notify the exec abstraction
instead of service. We did not observe this case elsewhere, because
Puppet programmers typically exploit the restart parameter of the
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service type to define a custom restart command in the following
manner: “service { restart => "/custom/cmd", . . . }”.
7 RELATEDWORK
Our work is related to three research areas, namely quality in IaC,
trace analysis, and modeling of file systems operations.
Quality in IaC.With the proliferation of the IaC process, there
have been numerous attempts to identify defects and quality con-
cerns in configuration code.
A number of studies focus on maintainability issues. Sharma
et al. [38] design and implement a code-smell detection scheme
for Puppet, which searches for issues related to naming conven-
tions, code design, indentation, etc. Their findings suggest that such
anti-patterns—as in the traditional programs—exist in many IaC
repositories. Van der Bent et al. [40] introduce a quality model for
Puppet programs which is empirically evaluated by interviewing
practitioners from industry. Schwarz et al. [36] do similar work fo-
cusing on Chef recipes. Endeavors have recently moved to the iden-
tification of security issues. Rahman et al. [33] define and classify
security smells into seven categories, such as hard-coded passwords
and the use of weak cryptographic algorithms, and then build a
tool for statically detecting these smells in Puppet repositories.
Other studies attempt to extract error patterns and source code
properties from the analysis of defective IaC programs. Rahman et
al. [34] employ machine learning and text processing techniques to
identify properties that faulty Puppet programs hold. Then, they
build a prediction model for asserting whether IaC scripts mani-
fest faults or not. Chen et al. [3] identify error patterns in Puppet
manifests by following a different approach. First, they inspect the
code changes from repositories’ commits. Second, they construct
an unsupervised learning model to detect error patterns based on
the clustering of the proposed fixes. Their approach is based on the
assumption that similar faults are fixed with similar patches [19].
There are few automated techniques proposed for improving the
reliability of configuration management programs. Rehearsal [37]
statically verifies that a given Puppet configuration is deterministic
and idempotent. Rehearsal models a given Puppet manifest in a
small language called fs and then it constructs logical formulas
based on the semantics of each language’s primitive. Finally, an
smt solver decides whether the initial program is non-deterministic
or not. Compared to our approach, Rehearsal is less effective and
practical. Specifically, Rehearsal employs a form of static analysis
that can only handle a subset of Puppet programs. For example,
the analysis does not support exec abstractions because it cannot
reason about the file system resources that exec processes. Unlike
Rehearsal, our approach operates on the actual system calls rather
than Puppet manifests; thus, it can effectively determine which files
are affected by a Puppet run and how.
Other advances [20, 23] adopt a model-based testing approach
for checking whether configuration scripts meet certain proper-
ties. Hummer et al. [23] focus on testing the idempotence of Chef
scripts. Their proposed framework generates multiple test cases
that explore different task schedules. By tracking the changes in the
system (they compare the system state before and after execution),
they determine if idempotence holds for a given program. Hanappi
et al. [20] extend the work of Hummer et al. and introduce Citac;
a framework that can be applied to Puppet manifests to examine
the convergence of programs. Convergence states that the system
reaches a desired state even at the presence of failed Puppet ab-
stractions. They formally express the properties of idempotence
and convergence, and through test case generation, they verify if
the provided manifests violate those properties. Contrary to Citac,
we adopt a more lightweight and practical approach applying man-
ifests only once. Finally, neither Rehearsal nor Citac detect issues
involving missing notifiers.
Trace Analysis. Analysis of system call traces has been widely
used in the past, especially for intrusion and malware detec-
tion [2, 6, 24, 42]. Mutlu et al. [30] collect execution traces from
JavaScript applications. Their traces do not track system calls, but
they capture memory and storage (e.g., cookies) accesses in the
context of the browser. They split traces into blocks, where each
block describes the execution of an asynchronous callback (e.g.,
ajax handler). As the execution of each handler is partially ordered,
they apply a simple data-flow analysis over traces to join the states
coming from different handlers. In this manner, they effectively
detect data races by identifying handler pairs where the merges
of their corresponding states result in different values of the same
variable. In our work, we also separate the trace sequences into
blocks. However, we are interested in file system operations instead
of reads and writes to memory locations. Also, we apply a different
methodology for discovering execution blocks that might lead to
harmful scenarios.
Modeling File System Operations. Several researchers have
designed specifications for the posix file system [17, 21, 31]. The
specifications mainly focus on program reasoning and verification.
Furthermore, Shambaugh et al. [37] have introduced fs; a small
language used to model the effects of Puppet abstractions on the
file system. In this work, we model system calls rather than Puppet
abstractions.
8 CONCLUSION
We have introduced a novel and practical approach for identify-
ing missing dependencies and notifiers in Puppet programs. Our
method collects the system calls invoked by a Puppet program and
models them in FStrace. Through FStrace, we capture how higher-
level programming constructs, such as Puppet abstractions, interact
with the operating system and derive their relationships. Then, our
method checks the inferred relationships against the program’s
dependency graph and reports potential mismatches.
The effectiveness of our approach is exemplified by the uncov-
ering of 57 previously unknown issues in 30 projects. Notably, we
provided fixes for 21 modules and 16 of them were accepted by
the developers. We have further showed that our tool can handle
realistic traces in a reasonable time. Our results indicate that our
tool can be used as part of the testing process for Puppet programs.
FStrace is a generic model that can be applied to other domains
with partially ordered constructs such as the asynchronous call-
backs of JavaScript. Recent work [4, 43] has showed that many
concurrency faults in Node.js applications are caused by data races
that appear in files instead of memory locations. As future work,
we are planning to leverage our method to detect such concurrency
faults in JavaScript server-side applications.
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